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If money talks, what does it say? Why do businesses contribute to political 
parties?  Ideology and pragmatism are two important alternatives.  They 
reflect fundamentally different relationships between firms and parties, the 
key collective actors of capitalism and representative democracy 
(Schattschneider 1942, 1).  Ideological payments are expressive.  Pragmatic 
payments are interested.  The pragmatic strategy seeks private goods from 
the political system.  Its effects on public policy should be disorganising and 
distorting.  In the language of American politics, the more important is 
pragmatic business financing of politics, the more important is “corporate 
pork”.  Pragmatism’s effect on political competition is conservative, in the 
sense that pragmatic firms will finance those in power and those likely to 
win power, disadvantaging newer or weaker competitors.  Ideological 
payments promote a public good.  They express a preference for 
government based on a particular set of values and assumptions.  Businesses 
often support a free-market ideology, but can also support other views of 
government and business, such as corporatism.  Ideological payments are 
aimed at influencing political competition.  Ideological payments usually 
represent a different sort of conservatism to pragmatism bolstering right-
wing parties. 
 
Is money a universal language?  Do business contributions to political 
parties convey different messages in different countries?  Does the relative 
importance of ideology and pragmatism vary according to political context, 
and, if so, why?  The most obvious starting point is to value the costs and 
benefits of alternative strategies of business financing of parties.  However, 
this is a proximate explanation.  To be sure, pragmatism is more common 
when the benefits of making a payment to a party outweigh its costs.  A 
more fundamental explanation needs to account for variation in the ratio of 
costs to benefits.  Two classic variables of comparative politics are 
promising candidates: the party system and the institutional structure.  The 
more ideologically polarised the principal political parties, the more likely is 
ideologically-motivated behaviour.  The greater is partisan control over 
public policy, the more likely is pragmatic behaviour.  In other words, 
pragmatism is associated with majoritarianism. 
 
This article is the first cross-national study of firm behaviour in 
political finance.  It infers motivation by relating the strategies of 960 firms 
to variations in political competition in three countries over periods of 
between seven and seventeen years.  In Australia and Canada, money tends 
to speak pragmatically, demanding an unlikely but potentially large benefit 
for a firm in exchange for a certain but small benefit for a party.  In 
Germany, money tends to speak ideologically, granting a certain but small 
benefit to a party as an expression of a political preference.  This variation is 
associated with party system polarisation and the majoritarianism of 
institutions. 
 
This paper contributes to the massive literature on the uneasy but 
vital relationship between capitalism and democracy (Dahl 1998, 179; Frye 
and Shleifer 1997; Kaufmann et al. 1999; Mills 1959; Olson 2000). The 
tension between the currencies of the market and democracy, between 
money and votes, is an inherent one (Lindblom 1977, 189-200; Vogel 1996). 
The political influence of big business is usually divided into intentional and 
structural categories (Lindblom 1977, 193-4; Offe 1985, 170-220).  A useful 
way of thinking about intentional business behaviour is to distinguish 
between different actors (Hillman et al. 2004; Wilson, 1990).  The firm can 
approach politics directly (Coen 1997; Martin 2000; Salisbury 1984; Useem 
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1984), or through intermediaries such as business associations (Bennett 
1999; Greenwood and Jacek 2000; Schmitter and Streeeck 1981) or political 
consultants (Heinz et al. 1993).  On the political side, there are huge 
differences between the bureaucracy, the executive and the legislature.  As a 
further complication, business may make contact with one type of political 
actor in order to influence a different political actor.  For example, parties 
can influence the legislature and the legislature can influence the executive.   
Pragmatic firms can pursue their interests with political parties through two 
principal channels, lobbying and cash contributions.  These are often, but 
far from necessarily, related.  There are other methods of relating to parties, 
such as charitable giving (Hansen and Mitchell 2000) and various types of 
networking.  These seem less important, and, of course, are also often, but 
not always, combined with lobbying or political finance.  This article 
understands pragmatic business financing of parties as part of the lobbying 
process.  The benefit of financial contributions for business is an increased 
likelihood of successful lobbying.    
 
While this research is easy to locate within the wider study of business 
and politics, it does not fit easily into an existing research programme.  Many 
of the above permutations of business and political actors have been 
intensely studied, but there is a very sparse literature on the relationship 
between firms and political parties.  Beyond Grant’s discussions of the 
“party state” (Grant 1993, 13-18; Grant et al. 1989), only a handful of 
systematic treatments are to be found (Della Porta 2004; Hopkin 1997).  
Thus, inspiration has to be somewhat indirect.  There is a well-established 
literature on comparative political finance.  However, it tends to tabulate 
sources of party income and expenditure in broad categories (Nassmacher 
2001; Scarrow 2007; Smilov and Toplak 2007; Williams 2000).  There is a 
handful of interesting country studies based on firms (Bond 2007; Fisher 
1994; Ramsay et al. 2002; Stanbury 1993, 291-318).  Scarrow (2006) draws 
some interesting comparative conclusions from the absolute and relative size 
of corporate and individual contributions to parties in Germany and the 
UK.   However, her study does not focus on the firm’s motivations as is 
done here.   
 
The most relevant literature to this article is the voluminous research 
on business financing of politics in the USA.  Like the present research, it 
exploits firm-level data on payments to politicians.  When compared to the 
potential value of benefits, business spends very little on political 
contributions (Ansolabehere et al. 2003, 108-9; Tullock 1972).    Surely, this 
reflects the costs politicians incur by taking business money.  Politicians 
must be seen to represent their constituency in order to gain re-election.  
They cannot afford a perception that their political support can be bought.  
In a democracy, politicians need to emphasise that the currency of votes 
trumps that of money.  Politicians have to manage their relationship with 
business supporters in such a way as to minimise this cost.  In terms of 
fundraising, politicians can try to raise money from non-business sources, in 
particular, ordinary voters.  To the extent that business funding in aggregate 
is important to them, they can reduce their reliance on any individual 
business, by raising small amounts from a large number of firms.   
 
American business contributions are variously interpreted as more or 
less legal bribery (Drope and Hansen 2004), purchase of access to politicians 
(Hall and Wayman 1990), signals to bureaucrats (Gordon and Hafer 2005) 
and legislators (Hall and Deardorff 2006, 80), mere gifts (Milyo 2002), and 
as “interested gifts”, which generate an obligation to reciprocate (Clawson et 
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al. 1998; Gordon 2005).  This last interpretation is the most convincing.  It 
is consistent with a number of observations that are generally accepted in 
the American literature: contributions are small (Ansolabehere et al. 2003, 
108-109; Sorauf 1992, 187); they are distributed strategically (Ansolabehere 
et al. 2003, 110; Krozner and Stratmann 2005; Stratmann 2005; 147-148); 
they are not routinely associated with policy benefits (Ansolabehere et al. 
2003, 113-114).  Business contributions are a small investment, with an 
uncertain and relatively low probability of a return at an uncertain point in 
time.  Moreover, the size of the return is also uncertain, but is likely to be 
very large indeed (Clawson et al. 1998, 68-71; Stigler 1971, 4-6).  So, this 
political investment is a little bit like a venture capital investment.   
 
While the US literature provides a very useful discussion of possible 
costs and benefits of business financing of politics, it is not framed 
comparatively.  Indeed, the US is a very awkward case from which to 
attempt to generalise.  Its presidential system obviously works very 
differently to the largely parliamentary regimes of other older democracies.  
Its elections and political finance are candidate-centred unlike the party-
dominated systems of other countries.  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, there are major limits on the source, size and purpose of 
business contributions in the US.  The “bizarre and incongruous 
regulations” (Persily 2006, 219) pertaining to political finance in America 
mean it is actually very difficult to interpret the reported payments as 
indicators of the calculations of businesses.  Therefore, in the next section I 
introduce theoretical frameworks to account for variations in ideological and 
pragmatic behavior at the micro (firm) level and at the macro (national) 
level.   
 
Ideology and Pragmatism at the Firm Level 
 
The distribution of ideologically motivated donations should be relatively 
stable over time.  Party ideologies change slowly.  Even if parties tack to the 
left or the right for tactical reasons, it is rare for the left-right ranking of 
parties to change.  In contrast, the distribution of pragmatic donations 
should follow short-term changes in the distribution of political power.  
These two motivations may interact in a single decision about the 
distribution of political contributions.  For example, take a firm that has an 
ideological preference for the right.  Under a left-wing government it may be 
prepared to contribute to the left, while also continuing to express its 
ideological preference by funding the right-wing opposition.  More 
generally, imagine an index of political power that runs from zero, when the 
right holds all power, to one hundred, when the left has a power monopoly.  
Also, let there be a measure of ideology: zero for a position at which any 
funding to the left is unacceptable and one for no ideological preference 
between left and right.  The product of these two is the percentage of a 
firm’s political contributions donated to the left.  So, a firm, which assesses 
all power to be held by the left, will contribute exclusively to the left if its 
ideological score is one, i.e. is if its motivation is purely pragmatic.  It will 
contribute zero to the left if its motivation is a purely ideological 
commitment to the right.  A firm, the right-wing preference of which is 
tempered by pragmatism, might split its contributions equally between left 
and right.  Please see Table 1.  To summarise, a firm’s distribution of cash to 
parties is a strategic decision taking into account political power and the 
firm’s ideological position, if it has one.   
[Table 1 about here] 
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At a point in time, the distribution of a firm’s money can be to the 
left, to the right, a hedge between left and right, and, of course, a firm can 
decide not to contribute.  If we consider two time points, shifts between the 
four basic distributions give us the sixteen cells in Table 2.  If the two time 
points are divided by a change of government we can identify some of the 
strategies as clear indicators of ideological (colour-coded white) and 
pragmatic motivations (colour-coded black).  In this example, a left-wing 
government has replaced a right-wing government.  It can be inferred that 
firms that gave to the left in opposition, as well as in government, are 
ideologically committed to the left.  Similarly, firms that continue to give to 
the right, even after its ejection from government, are committed to a right-
wing ideology.  Firms that shift from right to left, as power shifts from right 
to left, are classified as pragmatic.  Those that hedge before and after the 
election, have no ideological preference, and are pursuing a pragmatic, low-
risk strategy.  Other strategies suggest an interaction of ideological and 
pragmatic motivations (colour-coded grey).  Those that did not contribute 
while the right were in power, but contribute to the left when in power, 
combine an ideological preference for the left with a pragmatic desire not to 
signal hostility to a right-wing government.   Firms that hedge under the 
right but, under a left-wing government, contribute exclusively to the left, 
suggest a similar mix of pragmatism towards right-wing governments and a 
preference for the left.  The same logic applies to those that contributed to a 
right-wing government but abstain from political finance under the left and 
firms that plumped for the right in government but hedge after a turnover.  
The other seven cells do not have implications for the underlying 
motivations of the firms.     
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Ideology and Pragmatism at the National Level 
 
Variations in political systems should affect the choice of political strategies 
by firms.  If there is a wide ideological distance between the principal 
political parties ideological behaviour amongst firms should be more 
common.  Political institutions should also influence the relative frequency 
of ideological and pragmatic motivations, and, within the pragmatic 
category, the choice of a specific strategy.  Firstly, pragmatism should be 
more frequent in majoritarian systems because parties have more control 
over policy.  Control of the executive and legislature is usually combined 
and relatively unconstrained by other institutions.  By contrast, in a 
consensus democracy, individual parties have less control over policy.  They 
usually share control of the executive.  Moreover, control of the executive 
does not imply control of the legislature or vice versa.  The power of 
corporatist interest groups in consensus democracies is particularly relevant 
to business.  Business associations can provide a very strong constraint on 
the political system’s ability to affect business interests and a powerful 
alternative channel for firms seeking to lobby.  In consensus democracies, 
parties are also constrained by rigid constitutions, courts, central banks and 
independent regulatory authorities.  Secondly, majoritarian systems allow 
relatively quick and large swings in policy, constituting a political risk for 
business.  Thus, pragmatic firms will seek to insure themselves against this 
risk, which should be observable in higher contribution rates and more 
hedging.  Thirdly, controlling for overall party control of policy, diffusion of 
power amongst parties should be associated with increased hedging.  This 
might happen, for example, when a single party government is replaced by a 
coalition, or a government loses control of either or both houses of a 
 5 
legislature.  The next section introduces the data against which these 
hypotheses will be tested. 
Cases and samples 
 
The criteria according to which country cases have been chosen are the 
transparency and permissiveness of the political finance regime and the 
existence of a government turnover.  Australia, Canada and Germany have 
been selected for study.  As in the US, all three countries enforced relatively 
high levels of transparency.  In all three countries, political donations by 
businesses had to be reported.  The limit above which disclosure was 
required varied.  In Canada it was only C$100, in Australia A$1,500 and in 
Germany €10,000.  The Australian system reports all payments to political 
parties, whether they are donations or not.  In practice, many, and probably 
most, political contributions are reported as “other payments”.  In contrast 
to the US, there were no limits in any country on the amounts of money 
businesses could give.  Neither were there restrictions on the purposes for 
which it could be used.  The only significant restriction on source was a ban 
on foreign donations.  Thus, reported payments represent a relatively pure 
indicator of the political calculations of businesses, rather than flows of 
money that have been warped and constrained by a regulatory system.  Since 
2001, the UK has had a system with similar transparency and 
permissiveness.  However, there has yet to be a turnover under this regime.  
Australia, Canada and Germany seem to be the only three cases currently 
existing, which combine transparency, permissiveness and a turnover, to 
provide vital intra-case variation in political circumstances.   
 
The three countries differ in the ideological distance between their 
principal political parties, and, therefore, also vary in the potential for 
ideological behavior in party-firm relations.  The most obvious contrast is 
between Canada and the other two cases.  The two traditional competitors 
in the Canadian system, and the only two to have formed governments, are 
the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives (PC).  Both were regarded as 
“brokerage” parties (Carty, 2002, 726) or franchise organizations (Carty, 
2002, 730), which assembled relatively diverse electoral coalitions from 
across Canada.  Before the earthquake election of 1993 (Cairns 1994), the 
two had very similar profiles on economic matters, with the Progressive 
Conservatives having a somewhat stricter reputation in relation to budgetary 
management (Bélanger 2003, 544).  Prior to 1993, the main competitor of 
the two main parties was the New Democratic Party, the “social conscience 
of Canada”.  In 1993, the PC’s parliamentary representation was almost 
eliminated by the emergence of the Reform Party and the Bloc Québécois.   
 
The left-right divide has dominated Australian and German politics 
(McAllister 2002, 384; Scarrow 2002, 78).  In Germany, the centre-right has 
been occupied by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and its rather 
more conservative Bavarian ally, the Christian Social Union (CSU).  They 
have faced a social democratic party (the SPD), with its roots in socialism 
and continuing strong links to, including financing from, labor unions.  
Australia’s centre-right is also defined by a permanent coalition of the 
Liberal Party and the smaller National Party, which consistently wins rural 
seats in some areas.  (These two parties are often known as “the Coalition”.)  
They have faced the Australian Labor Party (ALP), again a party with a 
strong union wing.   The German party system is more complex.  For much 
of the post-war period, the pivotal role in coalition government of the liberal 
Free Democrats (FDP) suggested Germany was a “two-and-a-half” party 
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system.  The 1990s saw the rise of the Alliance 90/the Greens and the Party 
of Democratic Socialism, heir to the Socialist Unity Party in East Germany. 
This meant the SPD had serious competition on its left and reduced 
incentives for the SDP to move to the center (Kitschelt 1999, 329).  In 
recent decades, the ideological histories of the ALP and the SPD have been 
very different.  The ALP entered government in 1983, and became one of 
the most renowned deregulatory governments in the world, never mind one 
of the leading deregulatory left-of-centre governments (McMullin 1991, 418-
432, 442-43).  The SPD languished in opposition from 1982 to 1998.  They 
returned to power in 1998, in coalition with the Greens, having campaigned 
on a “New Middle” platform.  Thus, the German SPD’s decisive move to 
the centre came later, was less dramatic, and seemed more politically 
constrained than that of the ALP (Padgett 2003, 42).   The party system can 
be ranked in the following order of potential for ideological party-firm 
relations: Germany, Australia, Canada.  
 
Germany is the most consensual and Canada the most majoritarian, 
on both the executive-parties and federal-unitary dimensions of Lijphart’s 
two-dimensional map of democracy (1999, 248, 312).  On both dimensions, 
Germany is further from Australia than Australia is from Canada.  
Germany’s membership of the European Union is an important additional 
constraint, which removes many matters of concern to business from the 
bailiwick of German political parties.  There was little intra-case variation in 
the diffusion of power amongst parties in Germany and Canada.  There 
were no minority governments.  All German governments were coalitions 
between a large and a small party, while all Canadian governments were 
single party.  The Canadian Senate is a weak revisionary chamber (Luzstig 
1995; Simeon 2004, 100).  The German Bundesrat, the upper house of the 
national parliament, is composed of representatives of the Land (state) 
governments.  It has an absolute veto over legislation in areas of Land 
competence.  Its veto in other areas can be overridden by a majority in the 
lower house greater than the majority in favour of a veto in the Bundesrat.  
It was never controlled by the government during this period.  The 
Australian sample affords some opportunities to test institutional 
hypotheses.  All of the Australian jurisdictions, other than unicameral 
Queensland, have upper houses, with which governments often have to 
bargain over legislation.  John Wanna writes, “More than any other 
Australian jurisdiction, incumbency in Queensland is characterized by 
majoritarianism and a ‘winner takes all’ philosophy” (2003, 96).  Tasmania is 
an outlier in the opposite direction.  Its lower house works very consensually 
due to the importance of local interests that often trump partisan loyalties 
(Herr 2002, 584; Kellow 2003, 145).  In the period under analysis, except for 
one year of government control of the Commonwealth Senate, minor 
parties and independents held the balance of power in the second chambers.  
Since Australian federalism is, in general, highly symmetrical, and party 
systems essentially the same, these variations in legislative institutions avoid 
the omitted variable bias that often plagues attempts to test institutional 
arguments.    
 
In all three countries, samples have been drawn from published lists 
of large firms.  Practical considerations resulted in differences in the length 
of the lists and periods used to define the three samples.  Nonetheless, the 
country samples represent essentially comparable groups of consistently very 
large firms, with less than fifty per cent state ownership.  The research 
design avoids the potential sample selection bias (Kim 2008; Munger 1988) 
that is sometimes evident in the study of the distribution of contributions 
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(Burris 2001; Fisher 1994).  The Australian dataset exploits the essentially 
uniform political finance regulations and party systems at the federal level 
and in the six states, while the Canadian and German studies are restricted 
to the federal level.  There is at least one clear turnover in each sample.  
Please see Table 3 for basic information about the samples.  The next 
section analyses the data at the country level.   
[Table 3 about here] 
Firm Data Analysis 
 
The dependent variable is calculated from the official reports for each 
country.  The Australian figures incorporate payments to “associated 
entities”, as well as direct payments to parties.  “Donations” as well as 
“other payments” are included.  An average of 51 per cent of Canadian 
firms contributed each year, 32 per cent in at least one of the seven 
Australian jurisdictions and only 4.3 per cent in Germany.  To begin the 
study of firm strategy, a measure of Bias has been calculated, defined as 
payments to the major left of centre party as a proportion of payments to 
the two main parties (or electoral coalitions).  So, for Australia, this is a 
firm’s payments to the Australian Labor Party over the firm’s payments to 
the Australian Labor Party, the Liberal Party and its permanent ally, the 
National Party.  Bias in Canada is payments to the Liberals over payments to 
the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives.  In Germany, it is 
contributions to the Social Democratic Party over donations to the social 
democrats and the Christian Democratic Union and its permanent ally, the 
Christian Social Union.  As Figures 1 to 3 show, the distribution of 
payments across the three samples is very different.  In Australia, firms 
plump for both the left and right, with a much smaller proportion opting to 
hedge.  However, in Canada, almost as many hedge, as opt for either the 
Liberals or the Progressive Conservatives.  Finally, in Germany, the vast 
majority of firms paid exclusively to the CDU-CSU, with only a handful 
choosing the SPD.  Firms clearly cluster around the strategies introduced in 
the theoretical framework: non-contribution, a clear preference for one 
party or hedging.  More subtle distributions are very rare.  Thus, the 
dependent variable for multivariate analysis consists of four categories: no 
contribution; Left (bias >= 0.67); Hedge (bias between 0.34 and 0.66) and 
Right (bias <=0.33). 
[Figures 1 to 3 about here] 
 
The following variables are used to explain variation in the firms’ 
contribution strategies.  First, there is a dummy variable for Left Government.  
Next is Years to Election, which counts the number of years until the next 
constitutionally mandated election.  The first economic variable is Income 
(logged to reduce the impact of outliers).  Large firms are more likely to 
hedge because of the lower costs of payments relative to their income.  The 
German firms had larger incomes than their counterparts in Canada and 
Australia.  If the German threshold is calculated as a proportion of the mean 
income in the sample, it is barely higher than the Australian and Canadian 
thresholds.  Given that pragmatic firms should undertake a cost-benefit 
analysis of contributions, this seems like a reasonable approach to assessing 
differences in thresholds.  Finally, the firms have been classified into seven 
sectors, based on amalgamations of the UN ISIC classification.  This was 
necessary because of collinearity problems in more disaggregated versions.   
Different sectors have different exposure to politics (Stigler 1971) and 
different incentives to finance political parties. 
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Table 4 presents multinomial logits with random parameters (Greene 
2007, E23-19-24). The Australian and Canadian models conform to the 
framework introduced above.  For the German sample, it was necessary to 
collapse the hedge and left-wing categories.  The separate equations predict 
the logged odds of each of the contribution categories by reference to non-
contribution.  The sectoral dummies are not shown.  They are mostly 
significant in the Australian and Canadian cases but only sporadically so for 
Germany.  Income is statistically significant in all equations, and, in line with 
theory, the coefficients are bigger for the hedging category that for those 
firms that opt for left or right.  It is also unsurprising that the number of 
years to the election is always negative and is also statistically significant.   
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 
Left Government is important in all three cases, demonstrating a 
substantial amount of pragmatism in the three countries.  However, the role 
it plays varies.  Left-wing government cannot explain the relatively small 
amount of hedging observed in Australia.  In Canada, firms are less likely to 
hedge under a Liberal government and the coefficient is comparable in size 
to the other coefficients for left-wing government.  Left-wing government is 
negatively and significantly associated with contributions to the right in both 
Canada and Australia.  The Canadian coefficient is more than twice as large 
as its Australian counterpart.  The German coefficient is small and 
statistically insignificant.  This can be construed as evidence of the weakness 
of pragmatic motivations for contributing to the German right.  The 
absence of an incumbency effect on right-wing contributions suggests that 
many German businesses contribute in order to express their support for 
right-wing policies rather than hoping for benefits targeted at their own 
firm.  Finally, left-wing government is associated with contributions to the 
left in each country (to the left or hedging in Germany).  In Australia, this 
effect seems to be very small and is significant at a low level for such a large 
sample.  The Canadian and German coefficients are both approximately 
seven times larger.1   
 
The variations in the effect of Left Government across the strategies 
within countries suggest that pragmatism interacts with ideology.  These 
interactions can be understood in the two-period framework introduced 
earlier.  Australian businesses tend to react to left-wing government, not so 
much by contributing to the left, or even hedging between the Coalition and 
the ALP, but by refraining from contributing to the right.  In contrast, 
changes in government drive Canadian firms’ contributions to both the left 
and the right.  However, hedging is also frequent in Canada, and is especially 
favoured when the right are in power.  Finally, in Germany, most 
contributions are to the right and are not significantly affected by changes in 
                                                 
1
 These conclusions were subjected to a number of robustness tests.  
Multinomial logits with robust standard errors clustered by firm were run.  
This made no difference to the results.  Also, two models were run to test for 
robustness to some characteristics of the Australian sample.  Excluding the 
federal level did not change the conclusions.  The Australian data 
undoubtedly contains some payments, which are part of the day-to-day 
running of the party, rather than political contributions.  A business 
relationship is more likely in the business services, finance and insurance 
sectors.  Excluding the 22 per cent of firms in these categories also made no 
significant difference.   
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power.  However, the relatively small number of hedging and left-wing 
contributions is strongly associated with Left Government.   
 
While multinomial logits offer a rigorous analysis of rich data they are 
difficult to directly summarise.  However, it is possible to do so by 
manipulating the predictions implied by the models.  Please see Table 5.  If 
ideology is not important the parties should be treated identically in identical 
positions of political power.  The models predict that, in Australia, the 
probability of a manufacturing firm with an average income contributing to 
a right-wing government is twice that of a left-wing government.  In Canada, 
there is a small bias towards the Liberals.  The probability of a contribution 
to a right-wing German government is over seven times larger than the 
probability of a contribution to its left-wing counterpart.  Indeed, the 
conflation of hedging and leftist contributions in Germany means the 
ideological bias is even larger than this figure.  Changes of government are 
predicted to produce a seventeen per cent increase in the probability of a 
contribution to the newly governing party in Australia, versus a whopping 
forty per cent in Canada.  The German figure of fifteen per cent may be 
underestimated due to the combination of hedging and contributions to the 
left. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 
In order to further explore firm strategies in relation to incumbency, 
case studies of firm strategies before and after the turnovers of 1993 in 
Canada, 1998 in Germany and 2002 in South Australia were conducted.  
This exercise is not subject to formal statistical tests but it is undertaken 
with the backing of the previous significant results for Left Government.  
The case studies provide some provide a further illustration of the variation 
in the importance of ideology and pragmatism across the three countries. 
Figure 4, is based on classifications of every firm that contributed to the 
political parties in the parliament before and/or after the turnover.  The bars 
represent the proportions of classified contributions pursuing any of the 
strategies classified as ideological, pragmatic or an interaction of ideological 
and pragmatic motivations.  The combination of ideological and pragmatic 
motivations is by far the largest category in South Australia and Germany 
and joint largest in Canada.  The German turnover exhibits the most 
ideological behaviour and the Canadian the most pragmatic, with South 
Australia in between.  On their own, the case studies provide intriguing 
evidence.  Combined with the descriptive statistics and the multinomial logit 
estimates they allow a reasonable degree of certainty in asserting that 
pragmatic considerations are important across the three countries, but this 
pragmatism competes and interacts with ideology in different ways in each 
country.   
 
The costs and benefits of business financing are difficult to observe 
directly and systematically.  Nonetheless, as Figure 5 shows, the mean 
Australian or Canadian payment represented a much larger proportion of 
the firm’s income than in Germany.  This suggests that Australian and 
Canadian firms perceived a greater potential benefit from their payments.  
By contrast, as seen in Figure 6, the mean German payment represented a 
much larger proportion of party income than the mean Canadian payment.  
This makes sense if we accept that German payments were largely 
ideological and consider the costs to parties of accepting payments.  
Australian and Canadian parties had much greater incentives to discourage 
larger payments that would draw further attention to the interested nature of 
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business financing of politics.  However, due to the rarity of payments, in 
aggregate, business was not an important source of finance for German 
parties, even on the right.  There is no indication that business financing was 
systematically or substantially linked to benefits for German businesses.  By 
contrast, in Canada and Australia, decades of journalistic investigations 
consistently report a relatively institutionalised system linking political 
contributions with limited benefits for businesses.  In both countries, the 
dominant interpretations were that money was straightforwardly traded for 
access (Chamberlin 1995; Mitchell 2006; Mittelstaedt 1993; Naumetz 1986) 
and/or helped build relationships (Allen 1989; Curtis 1999; Day 1995; Millar 
2008), which might improve the chances of successful lobbying at some 
point in the future.  The similarity between the two countries is more 
remarkable than any differences.  Very similar mechanisms and language 
were employed in the same countries.  Nonetheless, the more or less blatant 
sale of access may have been more frequent in Australia than in Canada.   
The available quantitative and qualitative data on the costs and benefits of 
business financing in the three countries is consistent with the previous 
analysis of firm strategy, which ranks Canada as the most pragmatic, 
Germany the most ideological and Australian in the middle.  The next 
section tests party system and institutional explanations of this variation.   
[Figures 5 and 6 about here] 
 
 
 
Cross-national Analysis 
 
Pragmatism and ideology in party-firm relations are associated with party 
system polarisation.  Non-ideological Canada is the most pragmatic and 
relatively polarised Germany is the most ideological, with Australia, as usual, 
in the middle.  Australia provides the opportunity to study some intra-case 
variation.  The Australian Labor Party’s dash towards the market in the 
1980s and 1980s represented a major change in the ideological environment 
of Australian politics.  The ALP introduced a disclosure law in 1984 and 
substantially strengthened it in 1992 (Chaples 1994, 31).  However, this era 
did not represent a withdrawal of business from financing parties, but rather 
a shift from ideological to pragmatic motivations.  The ALP used disclosures 
to target traditional Liberal donors (Gordon and Ceresa 1995).  The ALP’s 
new attitude to business reached its most extreme in Western Australia, 
which was rocked by spectacular scandals in the late 1980s (Cohen 2007; 
Wainwright 1992).  In other jurisdictions, the ALP began to build a system 
to encourage pragmatic donations by offering a range of access and 
relationship-building events and memberships.   The Liberals could no 
longer take business support for granted and had to respond in kind by also 
facilitating pragmatic contributions.   
 
Majoritarianism is positively associated with pragmatism across the 
three country cases.  Majoritarian Canada is the most pragmatic, followed by 
Australia, with consensual Germany dominated by ideological contributions.  
Unfortunately, of course, majoritarianism is collinear with party system 
polarisation across the three states.  Variation within Australia controls for 
the party system.  Queensland’s majoritarianism seems to be associated with 
greater pragmatism amongst contributing businesses.  It is the only state 
where ALP dominance of government and public popularity has been 
reflected in ALP dominance of business contributions.  The marginality of 
Coalition donors in Queensland is remarkable in comparison to the bias 
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towards the Coalition under popular multi-term ALP governments in 
Victoria, New South Wales, and Western Australia. 
 
Hedging is positively associated with majoritarianism in the three 
datasets, but, again, there is collinearity with polarisation.  Intra-Australian 
evidence contradicts this hypothesis.  Hedging is most frequent in 
consensual Tasmania, which admittedly has a very low contribution rate.  
Moreover, majoritarian Queensland has the lowest level of hedging.  The 
contribution rate is highest in majoritarian Canada and lowest in consensual 
Germany.  The significance of this pattern is reduced by collinearity with 
polarisation.  Evidence from the Australian states does not support this 
hypothesis.  Variations in contribution rate are very clearly associated with 
GDP, and not with majoritarian institutions.   The last hypothesis is: the 
more equal the distribution of power amongst parties the more frequent is 
hedging.  The cross-national pattern contradicts this pattern, but does not 
control for the overall power of parties in the political system.  This is the 
logic of hypothesis two, which says that businesses should insure themselves 
against the risk of powerful parties changing policy by hedging.  This 
problem is avoided by testing amongst the Australian states, which have 
identical constitutional powers.  The pattern supports the hypothesis.  
Hedging is most frequent in Tasmania, where parties have to co-operate in 
the legislature and least frequent in Queensland, where the government can 
ignore the opposition.  A final test is provided by the Coalition’s gaining of a 
majority in the Commonwealth Senate in late 2004 (McAllister 2005).  This 
should have lead to a reduction in hedging, but the opposite happened.  
Table 6 summarises the institutional tests.  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Overall, the party system explanation fits the predicted pattern in the 
two hypotheses that were tested.  However, controlling for political 
institutions, it only passes the intra-Australian test.  One, or maybe one and 
a half, of the three institutional hypotheses were supported by the evidence.  
Collinearity does not really affect this outcome.  The institutional 
explanation was subjected to a nine separate tests, compared to two for the 
party system.  Nonetheless, the party system hypothesis met no actual 
disconfirming evidence.  While the party system hypothesis has perhaps 
been slightly more successful, it is difficult to choose between the two 
explanations.  A clearer result would have been theoretically informative, 
and might provide some clues for would-be reformers of political finance 
regimes.  However, such a result is not necessary to make cross-national 
predictions because the collinearity between institutions and ideological 
polarisation is not a particular feature of this article’s sample.  The two are 
widely accepted to be associated with each other.  The evidence presented 
here suggests that, in consensual countries with relatively polarised political 
competition, firms are likely to make ideological contributions to parties, 
and, in majoritarian countries with centrist competitors, firms are likely to be 
pragmatically motivated in financing parties.   
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Business money does talk politics.  In pragmatic Australian and Canada, it 
says, softly and subtly, but insistently, that, in exchange for small but certain 
financial benefits, that contributing businesses expect to receive special 
consideration of their lobbying efforts.  This expectation was relatively 
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firmly embedded in a long-established and well-known, if far from 
predictable, system of party-firm relations.  Special consideration was 
delivered through personal and organisational relationships that would not 
have existed, or would have been of inferior quality, had financial 
contributions not been made.  In Germany, there was no such systematic 
integration of political finance and party-firm relations.  Payments tended to 
express the traditional ideological preference of German business for right-
wing parties, and their suspicion of the social democrats.  This variation 
reflects fundamental differences in political competition across the three 
countries.  In Germany, the principal competitors are the heirs to class 
struggle and have to deal with ongoing tensions about the distribution of 
wealth in society.  A small number of German businesses still express their 
preference for the market by donating consistently to the right.  Germany’s 
political system struggles to deliver change without a very wide consensus 
across parties, states, and, indeed, Europe.  Therefore, firms are exposed to 
minimal policy risk and have little incentive to make pragmatic payments to 
parties.  In Canada, the two centrist parties shared a fundamentally pro-
business position, thus there was virtually no ideological choice to be made.  
However, Canada’s powerful executive can make substantial policy changes, 
without taking other institutions into account.  A majority of large Canadian 
firms tried to insure themselves against policy risk by rewarding 
governments from both parties and hedging against changes of government.  
Australia exhibits a mix of pragmatism and ideology.  Historically, the 
Liberals were the party of business and the market, while the Australian 
Labor Party kept its distance from business, while maintaining a good 
relationship with labor unions.  There is still a bias towards the right in the 
business financing of political parties, but this seems to have diminished due 
to the ALP’s conversion to the market in the 1980s.  Like Canada, the 
Australian jurisdictions exhibit many characteristics of classic Westminster 
majoritarianism.  In this institutional context, it is rational for many firms to 
make payments to parties seeking access and opportunities to develop 
relationships, which may deliver massive benefits in the future.  Across 
Australian jurisdictions, there is evidence that firms adjust their strategies 
according to the institutional configuration of the political system.   
 
These differences are likely to have had major consequences.  
Germany’s low contribution rate means that it is unlikely that businesses 
have influenced the outcome of party political competition.  For different 
reasons, the same is probably true for Canada.  The logic of pragmatism is 
to reflect, rather than to try to modify, existing distributions of political 
support.  The Australian combination of ideologically-motivated 
contributions and a relatively high contribution rate means that businesses 
systematically bias Australian politics towards the right.  Pragmatism should 
have important effects on public policy.  While there is no suggestion that, 
except in very rare cases, policy was bought in Australia and Canada, there is 
a consensus that business payments to parties were interested.  An 
opportunity to make a pitch, or a hearing that was slightly more sympathetic, 
must have frequently meant a different decision was made.  In total, these 
decisions should have skewed the system towards private goods and away 
from public goods.  A large number of countries now meet the requirements 
of transparency and permissiveness that allow for useful statistical studies of 
business contributions to parties.  As internal variation develops over time, 
these countries will be available for analysis in the style of this paper.  
Therefore, this paper’s arguments have the potential for wider comparative 
testing.
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TABLE 1  Interaction of Ideology and Pragmatism 
Percentage of 
power held by 
the left 
Ideology 
Percentage of 
contribution to the 
left 
100 0 0 
100 1 100 
100 0.5 50 
Note: Contribution to the left is the product of power and ideology. 
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TABLE 2 Classification of Turnover Strategies 
Left in power Right in 
power Non-
contributor Hedge Left Right 
Non-
contributor   Interaction  
Hedge  Pragmatism Interaction  
Left   Ideology  
Right Interaction Interaction Pragmatism Ideology 
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TABLE 3 Characteristics of Samples 
 Firms Years Jurisdictions Observations Elections Turnovers 
Australia 450 7 (1999-2005) 7 22050 14 1 
Canada 195 17 (1984-2000) 1 3315 4 2 
Germany 315 14 (1992-2005) 1 4410 3 1 
Notes: Firms with over 50% direct state ownership have been excluded.  The Australian sample is defined by 
membership of the Business Review Weekly Top 1000 in both 1999 and 2005.  The starting date is set by the 
availability of electronic records, while the end date is set by a major regulatory change, which moved the 
threshold for reporting from A$1,500 to $10,000 per annum.  The Canadian sample is defined by membership 
of the Globe and Mail Report on Business Top 1000 in both 1983 and 1998 (Accessible via 
http://www.lib.uwo.ca).  The Canadian start date is due to the time-consuming nature of data entry. The end 
date marks a break in the continuity of records.  The German sample is defined by membership of Die Welt Top 
500 in both 1997 and 2002.  (See http://top500.welt.de)  1992 is the beginning of the German sample because 
of a large reduction in the threshold for reporting introduced in that year and 1997 is the earliest year for which 
the Die Welt list is available.  2005 is the last year for which data is available.  The formation of a grand 
coalition in Germany in 2005 is not counted as turnover. 
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TABLE 4 Multinomial Logit Estimates of Firm Strategy 
 Australia Canada Germany 
Strategy Hedge Hedge - 
Left Government .18018 (.15236) 
-.82232 
(.11094)***  
Years to Election -.43215 (.04458)*** 
-.44498 
(.05195)***  
Income (logged) 1.1461 (.04164)*** 
1.15182 
(.04809)***  
Constant -14.9506 (.494)*** 
-16.8783 
(.73016)***  
Strategy Right Right Right 
Left Government -.52158 (.07788)***  
-1.16194 
(.10745)*** 
-.24805        
(..20077) 
Years to Election -.11323 (.03836)***  
-.34063 
(.04604)*** 
-.19796       
(.10388139)* 
Income (logged) .88661 (.03006)*** 
.5055 
(.035)*** 
1.2003        
(.14268)***       
Constant -10.4053 (.274)***  
-5.4618 
(.4978)*** 
-8.4882        
(.55102)*** 
Strategy Left Left Hedge/Left 
Left Government .13695 (.07956)*  
.88933 
(.08765)*** 
.88035  
 (.41522)** 
Years to Election -.19835 (.0438)*** 
-.08595 
(.04563)* 
-.3559 
 (.1865)* 
Income (logged) .98691 (.03339)*** 
.72671 
(.03866)*** 
1.5441       
 (.26373)*** 
Constant -12.077 (.32728)*** 
-11.6567 
(.555)*** 
-12.994       
(1.60775)*** 
Sectoral controls Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -7314.349 -2999.045 -591.7491      
Observations 22050 3315 4410 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5% * = significant at 10%.  
Australian incomes interpolated for 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004.  Canadian income figures imputed from data for 
1983, 1987, 1994 and 1998 using Amelia II (King et al. 2001). . German incomes imputed from data for 1997, 
1998, 1999, 2002, 2005, excluding banks and insurers for which no income figures were available.   
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TABLE 5 Summary of Models’ Implications 
 Australia Canada Germany 
Ideology measure 2.08 (to the right) 
1.25 
(to the left) 
7.34 
(to the right) 
Incumbency measure 17.06 40.5 15.06 
Notes: The figures in this table are based on predictions from the equations in Table 4 for a 
manufacturing firm (the modal sector in all three countries), with a mean income and the mean 
number of years to an election.  The ideology figure compares the probability of a contribution to a 
right-wing government to that for a left-wing government.  If the right-wing probability is larger the 
statistic is the right divided by the left.  If the left-wing probability is larger the statistic is the left 
divided by the right.  The incumbency measure compares probabilities of contribution to the right 
and the left in opposition and in government.  The score is the mean of the government minus the 
opposition probabilities for the two parties as a percentage of the mean total probability of 
contributions to either party when either is in government. 
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TABLE 6 Institutional Tests 
H  Prediction Finding Interpretation 
1 
Majoritarianism is 
positively associated 
with pragmatism. 
 
Evidence tends to support 
hypothesis 
Canada, 
Australia, 
Germany 
Canada, Australia, 
Germany 
Null (collinear with party 
system) 
 Queensland, 
others, 
Tasmania 
Queensland, others, 
Tasmania 
Evidence tends to support 
hypothesis 
2 
Majoritarianism 
increases the risk of 
policy change. 
 
Evidence tends to reject 
hypothesis 
2A 
Majoritarianism 
increases the 
contribution rate. 
Canada, 
Australia, 
Germany 
Canada, Australia, 
Germany 
Null (collinear with party 
system) 
 
Queensland, 
others, 
Tasmania 
Contribution rates 
are explained by 
size of economy. 
Evidence tends to reject 
hypothesis 
2B 
Majoritarianism is 
positively associated 
with hedging. 
Canada, 
Australia, 
Germany 
Canada, Australia, 
Germany 
Null (collinear with party 
system) 
 
Queensland, 
others, 
Tasmania 
Tasmania, others, 
Queensland 
Evidence tends to reject 
hypothesis 
3 
A more equal the 
distribution of power 
amongst parties 
increases hedging. 
 Null 
Germany, 
Australia, 
Canada 
Canada, Australia, 
Germany 
Null (no control for overall 
power) 
Tasmania, 
others, 
Queensland 
Tasmania, others, 
Queensland 
Evidence tends to support 
hypothesis  
Commonwealth 
2005 versus 
pre-2005 
 
Evidence tends to reject 
hypothesis 
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FIGURE 1 Distribution of Bias - Australia 
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Note: Obs=2162; 239 firms.  Bias is proportion of reported contributions to the Liberal-
National coalition and the Australian Labor Party paid to Labor in a given jurisdiction in a 
given year. 
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FIGURE 2 Distribution of Bias - Canada 
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Note: Obs=1696; 167 firms.  Bias is proportion of reported contributions to the Progressive 
Conservatives and Liberals paid to the Liberals in a given year. 
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FIGURE 3 Distribution of Bias - Germany 
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Note: Obs=191; 59 firms.  Bias is proportion of reported contributions to the Social Democrats 
and Christian Democratic Union – Christian Social Union paid to the Social Democrats in a 
given year.   
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FIGURE 4 Comparison of turnover strategies 
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Notes: The figures represent the proportion of classified contributors in the three categories.  
The classifications are derived from contributions in the parliaments before and after the 
turnover elections.  Canada: N=169 firms.  There were 9.5 times as many contributors inside 
categories as outside them. Germany: N=42 firms.  There were 2.5 times as many contributors 
inside the colour-coded categories as outside them.  The South Australian election was in 
February and the accounting year for the Australian Electoral Commission begins in July.  The 
figures are the mean of three different measurement strategies: (1) Leaving out 2002, counting 
2002 as a year of Liberal government and counting 2002 as a year of Labor government.   The 
mean number of contributors was 52.  There were 3.3 times as many contributors inside the 
categories as outside them. 
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FIGURE 5 Value of payments to firm 
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Note: Australian measures based on explicitly identified donations, or excluding those sectors 
most likely to trade with parties, reduce the Australian score to lower than the Canadian figure, 
but still higher than Germany.  Eliminating Australian and Canadian payments to below the 
German threshold (using the exchange rate) maintains the same clear ranking of countries. 
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FIGURE 6 Value of payments to party 
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Note: Changing the Australian measure to include only explicitly identified donations reduces 
the Australian score to slightly below Germany.  Excluding those sectors most likely to trade 
with parties reduces the Australian score to slightly below Canada.   Eliminating Australian and 
Canadian payments to below the German threshold (using the exchange rate) brings Canada up 
to Germany’s level, while extending Australia’s lead. 
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